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TAXATION
EMMERSON BLUE*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article constitutes an analysis of selected tax cases decided by
the Seventh Circuit during its most recent term. For purposes of dis-
cussion, the cases have been divided into three categories: civil income
tax, estate and gift tax, and criminal.
Cases have been selected on the basis of the writer's estimate of
their importance and interest to attorneys dealing with federal taxation.
Since the vast majority of tax questions that arise in practice are of a
civil nature, this area has been treated most extensively.
In the discussion of criminal cases, only those issues that present
problems of special interest in the tax field will be considered.
H1. CIVIL INCOME TAX
A. Commuting Expenses
Generally, taxpayers cannot deduct the cost of going to and from
work. If, however, the taxpayer must carry his tools to and from work
(musical instruments, carpenter's tools, etc.) he may be entitled to a
deduction.'
The government's position on commuting expenses is contained in
REV. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 Cum. Bull. 34. If the taxpayer would use
his own trasportation, regardless of whether he had tools to transport,
he was not entitled to a deduction. On the other hand, if he would not
use his own transportation but for the tools, he was entitled to a full
deduction. In Lawrence D. Sullivan,2 the tax court held that no de-
duction was allowable in any case. The Second Circuit reversed the
tax court's Sullivan decision and held that the taxpayer is entitled to
have a business portion deduction, by allocation, regardless of whether
he would use his own transportation.3
* Assistant Professor of Law at IIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162.
2. 45 T.C. 217 (1965).
3. Sullivan v. Comm'r, 368 F.2d 1007 (2nd Cir. 1966).
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The Seventh Circuit, in Tyne v. Commissioner4 adopts the deci-
sion of the Second Circuit. Since Tyne would have driven to work
regardless of whether he had tools to transport (there was no public
transportation to his job site), the court stated that he was not entitled
to a full deduction. It held, however, that there was a business portion
even though it was impossible to determine the amount with accuracy.
Tyne was allowed one half of his "commuting expense" as a business
deduction.
B. Imputation of Interest
Section 1235 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was enacted
to give long term capital gain treatment to income derived by "holders"
of patents and patent rights who transfer said rights to corporations
for royalties and other payments regardless of how long these rights
have been held.
The government's position is that if a transfer does not qualify
under section 1235, transfers may look to other Code sections to secure
long term capital gain treatment of the proceeds.5 If the patent or
patent rights are capital assets in the hands of the transferor, such
transferor may secure long term capital gain treatment under the gen-
eral provisions of sections 1221, 1222, and 1223.8
Section 483, 7 enacted in 1964, is designed to prevent taxpayers
from converting interest income to capital gain by providing, generally,
that installment sales contracts must include an interest factor. Section
483(f)(4) renders the general provisions of section 483 inapplicable
to transfers under section 1235.
In Busse v. Commissioner,' the taxpayer transferred patent rights
to a corporation in which he owned fifty percent of the voting stock.
He could not, therefore, secure long term capital gain treatment under
section 1235(a) because section 1235(d) renders this section inappli-
cable if the transferor owns more than twenty-five percent of the trans-
feree's stock.
The patent was a capital asset in Busse's hands, therefore, he was
able to secure long term capital gain treatment under the general provi-
4. 468 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1972).
5. Rev. Rul. 69-482, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 164.
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221, defines the term capital asset. § 1222
defines various terms, such as long term capital gain and short term capital gain.
§ 1223 discusses the method by which the holding period of the property is determined.
7. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 483.
8. 479 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1973).
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sions of sections 1221, 1222, and 1223 of the Code. Section 12399
did not render the gain ordinary as Busse owned less than eighty per-
cent of the stock of the transferee corporation.
The royalty agreement between Busse and the corporation did not
include an interest factor, but merely provided for a payment of five
percent of the selling price of the units manufactured and sold under
the patent. The government imputed intetest on the payments as per
section 483, even though section 483(f)(4) exempted transfers de-
scribed under 1235 from the general provisions of section 483. The
Commissioner's position being, of course, that Busse had not made a
transfer under section 1235. The tax court found for Busse and the
appellate court affirmed.
The Commissioner conceded that the transfer appeared to fall
within the literal language of section 1235(a), but asked that the stat-
ute not be strictly construed because it was plain that Congress had
not intended this result. The appellate court, however, refused to chal-
lenge the clear and unambiguous language of the section.
C. Presumption of Correctness of Signatures on Waivers
In United States v. Borchardt,'0 a federal income tax lien was
imposed under section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code of 195411
against property owned by Mary Mensik, wife of Charles Owen Men-
sik, the elusive Chicago savings and loan executive, for joint and sev-
eral federal income taxes for the year 1956. The lien was effective
to defeat the wife's interest in the property as long as the government
had the right to collect the tax.
Although the normal six year collection statute established by sec-
tion 6502(a)(1) 2 had expired, the government maintained that the
period had been extended by mutual agreement between the govern-
ment and the taxpayers under section 6502(a)(2) of the Code."3
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1239(a)(2), provides that if an individual trans-
fers depreciable or amortizable property to a corporation in which he, his spouse, and
his minor children and minor grandchildren own more than 80 percent in value of the
outstanding stock, any gain shall be treated as ordinary income.
10. 470 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1972).
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6321, creates a lien in favor of the United States
against the property of any person who neglects or refuses to pay any tax after demand
for payment is made.
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6502(a)(1), establishes that taxes must be col-
lected within six years of assessment unless a waiver is signed.
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6502(a)(2), provides for an extension of the six
year period by mutual agreement between the taxpayer and the government.
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The property against which the lien applied had been sold; so
the parties to the government's action to foreclose the lien included,
inter alios, the subsequent purchasers and the Mensiks. The Mensiks
were given notice by publication, but failed to appear, and a default
was entered as to them.
Since the wife's name appeared on the collection waiver executed
under section 6502(a)(2), the district court granted summary judg-
ment holding that under section 606414 there was a presumption that
the signature was authentic. The appellate court vacated the judgment
and remanded the case.
There are two lines on the waiver that are to be used by spouses
with joint liability. A third line follows which is preceded with "By",
to be used when someone signs in a representative capacity such as
a corporate officer. The waiver in question showed what was pur-
ported to be the wife's and husband's signatures on the proper lines
and the husband's signature on the "By" line.
The court held that the presumption under section 6604 was over-
ridden by the above irregularity on the face of the instrument and that
a material question of fact was raised thereby. The court also held
that the default against the Mensiks was no bar to a question of the
validity of the waivers by the present property owners, and vacated
the summary judgment.
D. Debt as Second Class of Stock Under Subchapter S
In Portage Plastics Company v. United States, 5 two non-share-
holder advanced money to a corporation under basically the follow-
ing conditions:
Amount: $12,500 each.
Interest Rate: Five percent of the net profit before income taxes.
Debt Instruments: Standard Notes.
Collateral: None.
Default Provisions: None.
Subordination Agreements: The notes were subordinated to other
creditors on two occasions.
The corporation subsequently elected the provisions of Subchapter S,
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6064, states that if an individual's name is
signed on a return or other document it shall be prima facie evidence that it was actu-
ally signed by him.
15. 470 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1972), rehearing granted en bane. Note: Upon re-
hearing, the court reversed its position and affirmed the district court holding. Slip
Opinion No. 71-1555 (March 2, 1973).
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sections 1371-1379 of the Internal Revenue Code,16 and acted accord-
ingly for its fiscal years ending May 31, 1961, 1962, and 1963. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue held that the "loans" described
above constituted a second class of stock and therefore the corporation
could not utilize the provisions of Subchapter S.
The district court, by applying the "thin capitalization" doctrine,
determined that the "loans" were contributions to capital but that they
did not constitute a second class of stock. 17 The district court relying
on W.C. Gamman,'8 held that the "thin capitalization" doctrine did
not apply to Subchapters S corporations since all undistributed taxable
income is taxed to the shareholders at ordinary income rates.
The appellate court agreed with the concept that a debt does not
constitute a second class of stock where the only question is the debt
to equity ratio. The court held, however, that the "thin capitalization"
doctrine is much broader. It includes such considerations as interest
out of profits, lack of fixed maturity dates, provisions for repayment,
subordination of priorities, and others.
The court held that if the proper standards were used in the "thin
capitalization" test-it found that the district court had used the proper
ones-the test is applicable to Subchapter S corporations. If further
held that once a determination was made that the advances were
equity, they constituted stock as there was no such thing as a non-
stock equity. Since the "interest" on the notes was based on a per-
centage of profits, the court had no trouble treating this as a preference,
thus making the notes a second class of stock.
The real factual difference between this case and previous cases
dealing with this problem is that the "debt" holders were not sharehold-
ers. The regulation, as amended,' 9 does not treat as a second class
of stock, debt held proportionately by the sharholders. The appellate
court sustained the validity of this regulation.
Portage Plastics apparently has no applicability to shareholders
who make proportionate advances to their Subchapter S corporations.
It has applicability where financing is obtained from outsiders who risk
16. INT. REV. CODE, OF 1954, §§ 1371-79. These sections provide generally that
the stockholders of a corporation may elect to have the undistributed taxable income of
the corporation taxed to them individually, with no tax to the corporation.
17. Portage Plastics Co. v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 684 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
18. W.C. Gamman, 46 T.C. 1 (1966).
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1968).
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their funds in a business without taking stock certificates of the same
class as the one outstanding.
E. Business Losses
J.R. Thompson Co. v. United States2 ° raises some interesting,
although somewhat academic, questions regarding business losses. It
involves the once famous Henrici's restaurant. The restaurant was ac-
quired in 1929 by J.R. Thompson Co., a corporate restaurant operator.
Part of this acquisition consisted of forty-two oil paintings, engravings
and prints, costing $185,000, which were displayed on the walls of
the restaurant as part of its Victorian decor.
The City of Chicago condemned the restaurant's leasehold in
1962, preparatory to erecting the Chicago Civic Center. on the site,
and thereby forced a closing of the restaurant. After the condemna-
tion, J.R. Thompson Co. considered re-opening the restaurant at an-
other location using the paintings to maintain the atmosphere of the
original restaurant. This was never done and the paintings were sold
in 1964.
After the restarant was closed in 1962, the company had the
paintings appraised ($44,000) and sought to deduct, as a business loss
under section 165 and/or 167 of the Internal Revenue Code,2 the
difference between the cost in 1929 and the appraised value in 1962.
With regard to section 165, the court said that most of the com-
pany's loss was not incurred in a trade or business. The court indi-
cated that if the purchase price in 1929 were more than the art market
value, such excess could be the basis for a business loss. In holding
that the loss in art market value was not deductible, the court differ-
entiated between a business loss and one incurred in a place of busi-
ness.
The court stated that the mere fact that an art owner chooses
to display his collection in his place of business, for whatever reason,
does not transform a loss incurred in the art market into a loss in-
curred in the business.
This holding does not appear to be supported by the facts. The
paintings were purchased as part and parcel of the restaurant; the pur-
20. 477 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1973).
21. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165, allows a deduction for losses in a trade or
business. § 167 provides for depreciation of tangible property used in a trade or busi-
ness.
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chaser was a corporation and therefore probably not an art collector.
The court was apparently concerned with the possibility of individuals
changing personal assets to business assets by placing them on display
at business locations. This would certainly be a different factual situa-
tion.
The court allowed no loss under section 165 because the company
failed to show that the condemnation was a "closed transaction." The
court also reaffirmed the generally accepted principle that works of
art, since they have no determinable useful life, are not subject to de-
preciation under section 167.
The final disposition of this case awaits the taxpayer's action for
the year 1964 when the loss was unquestionably realized. The court
indicated that the only loss allowable would be the amount paid in
excess of the art market value in 1929. It would appear, however,
that the paintings had always been business assets and that any loss
should be a business loss.
F. Capital Expenditures
In Clark Oil and Refining Corporation v. United States,22 prop-
erty owned by a third party and used as a paint factory, was surrounded
on three sides by property housing Clark Oil and Refining Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as taxpayer). The operation of taxpayer's re-
finery caused gas emissions, smoke and acid fumes to fall on the third
party's property creating a potential threat of explosion.
In order to eliminate this dangerous situation, taxpayer, commenc-
ing in 1953, made several attempts to purchase third party's property.
The parties, however, could not agree upon a purchase price and no
sales was consumated.
In 1958, third party filed suit to abate the nuisance created by
taxpayer. The parties agreed to settle the suit by having taxpayer pur-
chase the property at a price set by arbitration. The arbitrators recom-
mended a payment of $287,500 and the judge added $35,000 as
reasonable attorney's fees.
On its income tax return for the year in question, taxpayer de-
ducted all but $25,000 of its payment to third party as a liquidated
damage payment under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code.23
22. 473 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1973).
23. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162, allows deduction of ordinary and necessary
business expenses.
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The Commissioner disallowed the deduction since he termed it a capital
expenditure. The district court sustained the Commissioner and the
appellate court affirmed.
The appellate court started with the basic premise that capital ex-
penditures are not deductible by virtue of section 263.24 The court
also cited cases supporting the position that capital expenditures do
not change character simply because they are made in connection with
the settlement of a law suit.
At this point, the court decided to put basics aside and advanced
a theory dealing with the origin and character of the claim with respect
to which the settlement was made. In short, the court held that since
the litigation was commenced only after the parties could not agree
on the selling price, the acquisition of the property was at the heart
of the dispute. Taxpayer, therefore, was not allowed a deduction.
By implication, the court would have allowed a deduction if the
court litigation represented, in origin, a meritorious lawsuit in tort for
damages and injunctive relief. These remedies were prayed in the
third party's suit, but since taxpayer had tried to purchase the property,
this was ignored.
The holding appears unnecessarily aleatory. If the parties had
not discussed acquisition, taxpayer would be entitled to a deduction.
If taxpayer could show that it changed its mind about the purchase
and only wanted to settle the tort claim, it should be entitled to a de-
duction.
It seems that the proper settlement of the case would have been
to hold that the fair market value of the property constituted a capital
expenditure and any excess represented liquidated damages. This is
consistent with the court's statement that a capital expenditure is not
changed because it was made in settlement of a lawsuit. It certainly
seems improper to burden the property with a basis substantially in
excess of its value at date of acquisition.
HI. ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES
A. Gross Estate
In United States v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank,2' decedent, Ger-
trude W. Hanlin (hereinafter, taxpayer), was one of three beneficiaries
24. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 263, provides that no deductions shall be allowed
for capital improvements.
25. 470 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93-S. Ct. 554 (1972).
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under a testamentary trust set up by her grandfather. In effect, each
beneficiary received a life estate in the income from one-third of the
corpus with the remainder to go to the benficiary's issue or descend-
ents of issue. If a beneficiary died without issue or descendents of
issue, his life interest passed to the survivor or survivors of the three
life tenants; if all three beneficiaries died without issue or descendents
of issue, the remainder passed to the son of the testator and his heirs
at law.
Two of the beneficiaries died without issue and without descend-
ants of issue prior to taxpayer's demise survived by five children. She
possessed at least a life estate in the full corpus of the trust and pos-
sibly some other interest in the two-thirds received by survivorship.
Upon the demise of the taxpayer, taxpayer's executors failed to
include any part of this property in her estate as they viewed taxpayer's
interest as purely a life estate. The government agreed that the original
one-third interest constituted a mere life estate, but concluded that the
two-thirds acquired through survivorship was a determinable fee and in-
cluded this amount in the taxpayer's gross estate.
The executors did not contest the validity of the original assess-
ment; they eventually filed an Offer In Compromise in an attempt
to settle the liability of $92,459.63 for one thousand dollars. The gov-
ernment rejected the offer and filed suit in district court to collect the
tax in 1967. The district court sustained taxpayer's position that the
six year collection statute under section 6502 of the 1954 Internal Rev-
enue Code26 had expired.2 7 The appellate court reversed. 8  Since tax-
payer had filed an Offer In Compromise, the government had one year
from the rejection of the offer to commence its collection action.
In 1896, upon the demise of the first beneficiary, an action was
filed in state court (Illinois) to determine the property rights of the
survivors. The trial court determined that the deceased beneficiary's
share descended to the survivors as tenants in common in fee deter-
minable. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the corpus remained
in trust but refused to decide whether it was a detrminable fee or
a life estate.29 On remand, however, the trial court treated the interest
as a life estate. No appeal was taken from this holding.
26. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6502.
27. United States v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 267 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
28. United States v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 390 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1968).
29. Lombard v. Witbeck, 173 111. 396, 51 N.E. 61 (1898).
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The second beneficiary died in 1909 without issue or descendants
of issue, but his former wife brought an action to recover dower. The
trial court denied dower on the basis of the trial court's holding that
the interest acquired through survivorship was a life estate. On appeal,
the supreme court allowed dower in the one-sixth interest acquired by
survivorship calling that portion a determinable fee.30
We now return to the estate tax case. The district court refused
to follow the state supreme court's holding that taxpayer owned a de-
terminable fee.3 1  It followed the holding of the trial court that had
determined the interest to be a life estate as this ruling had not been
reversed. It did not deal with the question of the dower interest al-
lowed by the state supreme court except to say that it was judicially
created.
The Seventh Circuit court of appeals adhered to the principle
that state law determines the devolution of property and that the state's
highest court best knows its state law.3 2  As the state supreme court
had indicated that the survivorship shares were fees determinable, the
court sustained the government.
The district court apparently felt that the state supreme court's
holding was inconsistent with its description of interest acquired by
survivorship.3 3  The court stated that the acquired shares were held
under the same restrictions and conditions as the original shares which
were life estates. If the acquired interests were to remain in trust and
pass to the issue of the last survivor or, barring issue, to the testator's
son, they would certainly appear to be life estates. The court indi-
cated that the corpus of the acquired interests was alienable, however,
it gave no indication of what property rights taxpayer could alienate.
There was some merit, therefore, to the district court's contention that
the testator made a complete disposition of the property by his will.
B. Marital Deduction
In Greene v. United States34 a Wisconsin decedent left all of his
property to his widow. The widow filed a Declaration of Renunciation
30. Aloe v. Lowe, 278 IM. 233, 115 N.E. 862 (1917).
31. United States v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 26 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-6089
(N.D. Ill. 1970).
32. 470 F.2d at 10.
33. United States v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 26 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-6089
(N.D. Il. 1970).
34. Greene v. United States, 476 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1973).
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in which she disclaimed certain assets. These assets went to her three
sons who agreed to pay the estate taxes and expenses therefrom.
On the estate tax return, the widow computed a marital deduction
based on the remainder of decedent's property passing to her without
dimunition for estate taxes. On March 27, 1969, the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue charged the estate taxes to the widow's share and
made the corresponding assessment. The county court, on December
13, 1969, held that the taxes should be paid from the sons' share
of the estate. The assessment was paid, and thereafter, a claim for
refund was filed in district court. The district court sustained the com-
missioner 35 and the court of appeals affirmed.
The appellate court held that state law was to be used to deter-
mine upon whom the burden of the federal estate tax should fall. It
also decided that the Wisconsin law allowed a decedent to make the
determination in his will or allow the liability to be determined by stat-
utory and common law rules.
The decedent's will provided in part:
First: It is my will and I hereby direct all my just debts and ex-
penses of last illness and funeral be paid by my executor herein-
after named as soon after my decease as conveniently may be.3 6
The court interpreted "debts" to include the federal estate tax. It also
included that since all of decedent's property was to go to his widow
under the will, the decedent realized that his widow would have to
pay the estate taxes out of her share.
The court dispelled the widow's argument that it should presume
that her deceased husband wanted her to get the maximum marital
deduction; and, of course, the court did not consider itself bound by
the state court's determination that the sons were to pay the tax as
that decision was not from the state's highest court. The court cited
Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch31 in support of the latter.
C. Release of Powers
In Commissioner v. Estate of Robert R. Ware, Deceased,8 dece-
dent set up several family trusts and granted the trustee complete dis-
cretionary power to either accumulate or distribute income from the
35. Greene v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
36. 476 F.2d at 117.
37. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
38. 480 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1973).
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trusts. Decedent was the original trustee for all the trusts and was
to serve as such, under the terms of the instruments as long as he was
competent.
By several notarized documents, decedent tried to divorce himself
from the trust prior to his demise. New trustees had been appointed
and were acting as such prior to decedent's death. The government
contended that decedent's efforts to divorce himself from these trusts
were not effective and included the corpora in decedent's gross estate
under sections 2036 (a) (b) and/or section 2038 of the Code.39
The tax court held that decedent's extra judicial releases were not
effective.40 The appellate court reversed.
The appellate court held that the Illinois Termination of Powers
Act,4' applied to a power to alter or amend a trust and that no court
approval was needed.
IV. CRIMINAL CASES
A. Exclusion of Evidence
In United States v. Dickerson the court held that
Miranda warnings must be given to the taxpayer by either the
revenue agent or the special agent at the inception of the first
contact with the taxpayer after the case has been transferred to the
Intelligence Division. 42
A task faced by the court in its most recent term was a further
definition of the scope of this holding.
In United States v. Habig,4" the defendants were the chief stock-
holders of a corporation. Following a civil audit of the corporate rec-
ords, the case was transferred to the Intelligence Division of the In-
ternal Revenue Service for a full scale investigation. The district court
found that the investigation was directed against the defendants per-
sonally from its inception. A special agent examined the corporate
books in 1964 and 1965 without giving Miranda warnings. Criminal
proceedings were then commenced. The defendants moved to sup-
39. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a)(2), provides for the inclusion in the
gross estate of property over which decedent possessed the right to determine who
should possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom. § 2038 includes in the
gross estate property held in trust, where the decedent had power to alter or revoke the
trust.
40. Estate of Ware, 55 T.C. 69 (1970).
41. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 177-82 (1943).
42. 413 F.2d 1111, 1116-17 (7th Cir. 1969)._
43. 474 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 2145 (1973).
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press the evidence obtained, and the district court sustained this mo-
tion.
In a prior decision concerning this case, the court of appeals had
held that its holding in Dickerson would apply to the facts in Habig."
Upon remand, the district court again determined that the corporate
records and the leads obtained from them were inadmissible. On ap-
peal the Seventh Circuit reversed. 45
The court stated that "the law of the case" doctrine did not apply
in this instance. As the Supreme Court had previously held that the
right against self-incrimination was a purely personal one,4 6 the court
reasoned that Miranda warnings were not required to be given when
a request to submit corporate records is made by an Internal Revenue
Agent, even after the matter has been transferred to the Intelligence
Division.
This result is comparable to those reached by other courts that
have considered the problem. In Hensley v. United States, 7 the Tenth
Circuit, although refusing to extend Miranda to interviews that were
not custodial even after transfer to the Intelligence Division, stated that
a more certain reason was that the evidence was obtained from the cor-
porate records. In United States v. Maciel,4 8 a district court held that
the failure of agents to comply with an Internal Revenue News Re-
lease,4 9 while resulting in the inadmissibility of oral statements, did not
result in the exclusion of incriminating evidence obtained from the rec-
ords of a corporation.
In United States v. Waitkus,50 the court again reviewed the ques-
tion of the retroactivity of Dickerson. In accordance with its posi-
tion in United States v. Gallagher,5 1 United States v. Ming,52 and Dick-
erson itself, 53 Miranda warnings were held to be required for only non-
custodial interviews that took place after the date of the Dickerson
decision.
44. United States v. Habig, 413 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1969).
45. United States v. Habig, 474 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 93 S. Ct.
2145 (1973).
46. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
47. 406 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1968).
48. 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-5302 (D.R.I. 1973).
49. I.R.S. News Release No. 897, Oct. 3, 1967, 7 CCH 1967 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
6832, requires that special agents give Miranda warnings, when preliminary inquiries do
not resolve the potential criminal aspects of the case.
50. 470 F.2d (7th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 93 S. Ct. 1368 (1973).
51. 430 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1970).
52. 466 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 937 (1972).
53. 413 F.2d at 1117.
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In United States v. Lehman,54 the effect of the failure of Internal
Revenue Agents to comply with the requirements of an Internal Reve-
nue Service Manual 55 was considered.
On June 8, 1964, Dr. Lehman was interviewed for eight hours
by special agents of the Intelligence Division and his records were aud-
ited. Prior to the interview no Miranda warnings were given. During
the course of the interview the agents examined records after the de-
fendant had asked them to stop. This continued examination in the
face of the taxpayer's request was in contravention of the instructions
contained in a Service Manual.
The court held that as this was a pre-Miranda case, the failure
to give Miranda warnings did not result in the exclusion of any volun-
tary statements made by the defendant. After a lengthy discussion
the court concluded that the statements were voluntary.
In regards to the defendant's assertion that the agents acts were
in contravention of the Internal Revenue Service Manual, the court
stated:
It would be anomalous for us then to hold that the breach of an
internal regulation of the IRS ... leads to the exclusion of evi-
dence that the Constitution does not exclude.50
This statement may be compared with the decision of the First
Circuit court of appeals in United States v. Leahey,57 where the court
held that non-compliance with an Internal Revenue News Bulletin re-
sulted in the exclusion of the evidence obtaind. One of the factors
operative in Leahey was that-the news release was public and that the
persons or lawyers may have relied on it. The Internal Revenue Man-
ual in Lehman was viewed by the court as being an internal regulation.
B. Discovery by Defendant
In its last term, the Seventh Circuit re-evaluated its position as
to whether a report made by an Internal Revenue Agent constituted
a statement discoverable under the Jencks Act. 58 Previously, in United
54. 468 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 273 (1972).
55. Int. Rev. Man., Man. Transmittal 9300-20 § 9284.2, requires that the agent
not deny the taxpayer the right to refuse to give any evidence that would be incriminat-
ing.
56. 468 F2.d at 104.
57. 434 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1970).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1970), states:
After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examina-
tion, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to
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States v. Kieg 9 and United States v. Krilich,60 the court implied that
an agent's report was not a statement. The court in United States
v. Cleveland61 expressly disapproved of the language in these cases and
held that the trial judge should examine such reports in camera to de-
termine if the report relates to the subject matter about which the agent
testifies.
C. Attorney-Client Privilege and The Work Product Doctrine
In United States v. Brown, 2 an attorney had prepared a memo-
randum of a meeting attended by an accountant and an aide to the
taxpayer. The memorandum was placed in the files of the accounting
firm employed by the taxpayer. A summons was served on the firm
by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to section 7602 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.63  The district court, following an evidentiary hear-
ing, held that the document was producible. 64
On appeal, the appellate court held initially that as the memoran-
dum was a work product, and under the rule of Hickman v. Taylor6 5
was not protected by the attorney-client privilege. The court then
stated that the work product doctrine was applicable to an Internal
Revenue Summons but that the government had shown good cause that
the document was essential.
In its analysis the court noted that the strong interest expressed
by Congress in enforcing the Internal Revenue Laws was relevant in
determining what degree of necessity was required to avoid the work
produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession
of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness
has testified. If the entire contents of any such statement relate to the sub-
ject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order it to be
delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use. (Emphasis
added).
59. 334 F.2d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1964).
60. 470 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1972).
61. 477 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1973).
62. 478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973).
63. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7602 provides:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return
where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any
internal revenue tax .. . the Secretary .. . is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records or other data which may be
relevant or material to such inquiry;(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or
any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, cus-
tody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business
of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person
the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper . .. to produce such books,
papers, records, or other data . . ..
64. United States v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Il1. 1972).
65. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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product doctrine. The extent therefore of the applicability of the
doctrine to an Internal Revenue Summons remains to be determined.
D. Self-incrimination and Internal Revenue Summons
In United States v. Turner,16 the Internal Revenue Service served
a summons upon Turner, a tax preparer, seeking a list of those persons
for whom he had prepared tax returns. One of Turner's allegations
was that the summons violated his right against self-incrimination, as
it would aid the government to discover the returns he had prepared
and in gathering evidence against him.
The government maintained that Turner's fifth amendment privi-
lege was not violated in that he was not a member of "a highly selective
group inherently suspect of criminal activities. '67
The court defined the issue as the conflict between a legitimate
regulatory scheme and the individuals right to privacy. On the grounds
that there was no substantial risk of self-incrimination and there was
no expectation of privacy, the court allowed the summons.
V. CONCLUSION
Due to its long history, countless court battles, and numerous sta-
tutory revisions, the federal tax area does not readily lend itself to land-
mark court decisions. Many cases presently being decided contain
somewhat novel issues that, while being material to the taxpayers in-
volved, have no wide application to the tax laws generally.
Although most of the cases discussed above fall in this category,
the significance of any case must await the test of time. In the tax
area where changing economic conditions quite often dictate the form
and content of a transaction, this is especially true. It seems, there-
fore, that judgment at this time is premature.
66. 480 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1973).
67. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
